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Abstract
Halpern and Pearl introduced a definition of actual causal-
ity; Eiter and Lukasiewicz showed that computing whether
X = x is a cause of Y = y is NP-complete in binary models
(where all variables can take on only two values) and ΣP2 -
complete in general models. In the final version of their pa-
per, Halpern and Pearl slightly modified the definition of ac-
tual cause, in order to deal with problems pointed by Hopkins
and Pearl. As we show, this modification has a nontrivial im-
pact on the complexity of computing actual cause. To charac-
terize the complexity, a new family DPk , k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., of
complexity classes is introduced, which generalizes the class
DP introduced by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (DP is just
DP1 ). We show that the complexity of computing causality
under the updated definition is DP2 -complete.
Chockler and Halpern extended the definition of causality by
introducing notions of responsibility and blame. The com-
plexity of determining the degree of responsibility and blame
using the original definition of causality was completely char-
acterized. Again, we show that changing the definition of
causality affects the complexity, and completely characterize
it using the updated definition.
1 Introduction
There have been many attempts to define causality going
back to Hume (1739), and continuing to the present (see, for
example, (Collins, Hall, & Paul 2004; Pearl 2000) for some
recent work). The standard definitions of causality are based
on counterfactual reasoning. In this paper, we focus on one
such definition, due to Halpern and Pearl, that has proved
quite influential recently.
The definition was originally introduced in 2001
(Halpern & Pearl 2001), but then modified in the final jour-
nal version (Halpern & Pearl 2005) to deal with problems
pointed out by Hopkins and Pearl (2003). (For ease of refer-
ence, we call these definitions “the original HP definition”
and “the updated HP definition” in the sequel.) In gen-
eral, what can be a cause in both the original HP defini-
tion and the updated definition is a conjunction of the form
X1 ← x1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xk ← xk , abbreviated ~X ← ~x; what is
caused can be an arbitrary Boolean combinationϕ of formu-
las of the form Y = y. This should be thought of as saying
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that setting X1 to x1 and . . . and setting Xk to xk results
in ϕ being true. As shown by Eiter and Lukasiewicz (2002)
and Hopkins (2001), under the original HP definition, we
can always take causes to be single conjuncts. However, as
shown by Halpern (2008), this is not the case for the updated
HP definition.
Using the fact that causes can be taken to be single con-
juncts, Eiter and Lukasiewicz(2002) showed that deciding
causality (that is, deciding whetherX = x is a cause of ϕ) is
NP-complete in binary models (where all variables can take
on only two values) and ΣP2 -complete in general models. As
we show here, this is no longer the case for the updated HP
definition. Indeed, we completely characterize the complex-
ity of causality for the updated HP definition. To do so, we
introduce a new family of complexity classes that may be of
independent interest. Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (1984)
introduced the complexity class DP , which consists of all
languagesL3 such that there exists a language L1 in NP and
a language L2 in co-NP such that L3 = L1 ∩ L2. We gen-
eralize this by defining DPk to consist of all languages L3
such that there exists a language L1 ∈ ΣPk and a language
L2 ∈ Π
P
k such that L3 = L1 ∩ L2.
Since ΣP1 is NP and ΠP1 is co-NP, DP1 is Papadimitriou
and Yannakakis’s DP . We then show that deciding causal-
ity under the updated HP definition is DP2 complete. Pa-
padimitriou and Yannakakis (1984) showed that a number
of problems of interest were DP complete, both for binary
and general causal models. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first time that a natural problem has been shown
to be complete for DP2 .
Although, in general, causes may not be single conjuncts,
as observed by Halpern (2008), in many cases (in particular,
in all the standard examples studied in the literature), they
are. In an effort to understand the extent to which the dif-
ficulty in deciding causality stems from the fact that causes
may require several conjuncts, we consider what we call the
singleton cause problem; that is, the problem of deciding if
X = x is a cause of ϕ (i.e., where there is only a single
conjunct in the cause). We show that the singleton cause
problem is simpler than the general causality problem (un-
less the polynomial hierarchy collapses): it is ΣP2 complete
for both binary and general causal models. Thus, if we re-
strict to singleton causes (which we can do without loss of
generality under the original HP definition), the complexity
of deciding causality in general models is the same under the
original and the updated HP definition, but in binary models,
it is still simpler under the original HP definition.
Causality is a “0–1” concept; ~X = ~x is either a cause of ϕ
or it is not. Now consider two voting scenarios: in the first,
Mr. G beats Mr. B by a vote of 11–0. In the second, Mr. G
beats Mr. B by a vote of 6–5. According to both the original
and the updated HP definition, all the people who voted for
Mr. G are causes of him winning. While this does not seem
so unreasonable, it does not capture the intuition that each
voter for Mr. G is more critical to the victory in the case
of the 6–5 vote than in the case of the 11–0 vote. The no-
tion of degree of responsibility, introduced by Chockler and
Halpern (2004), does so. The idea is that the degree of re-
sponsibility ofX = x for ϕ is 1/(k+1), where k is the least
number of changes that have to be made in order to make
X = x critical. In the case of the 6–5 vote, no changes have
to be made to make each voter for Mr. G critical for Mr. G’s
victory; if he had not voted for Mr. G, Mr. G would not have
won. Thus, each voter has degree of responsibility 1 (i.e.,
k = 0). On the other hand, in the case of the 11–0 vote, for a
particular voter to be critical, five other voters have to switch
their votes; thus, k = 5, and each voter’s degree of respon-
sibility is 1/6. This notion of degree of responsibility has
been shown to capture (at a qualitative level) the way peo-
ple allocate responsibility (Gerstenberg & Lagnado 2010;
Lagnado, Gerstenberg, & Zultan 2013).
Chockler and Halpern further extended the notion of de-
gree of responsibility to degree of blame. Formally, the de-
gree of blame is the expected degree of responsibility. This
is perhaps best understood by considering a firing squad with
ten excellent marksmen. Only one of them has live bul-
lets in his rifle; the rest have blanks. The marksmen do
not know which of them has the live bullets. The marks-
men shoot at the prisoner and he dies. The only marks-
man that is the cause of the prisoner’s death is the one with
the live bullets. That marksman has degree of responsibil-
ity 1 for the death; all the rest have degree of responsibil-
ity 0. However, each of the marksmen has degree of blame
1/10.The complexity of determining the degree of respon-
sibility and blame using the original definition of causality
was completely characterized (Chockler & Halpern 2004;
Chockler, Halpern, & Kupferman 2008). Again, we show
that changing the definition of causality affects the complex-
ity, and completely characterize the complexity of determin-
ing the degree of responsibility and blame with the updated
definition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we review the relevant definitions of causality. In
Section 3, we briefly review the relevant definitions from
complexity theory and define the complexity classes DPk . In
Section 4 we prove our results on complexity of causality.
Some proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2 Causal Models and Causality: A Review
In this section, we review the details of Halpern and Pearl’s
definition of causal models and causality, describing both the
original definition and the updated definition. This material
is largely taken from (Halpern & Pearl 2005), to which we
refer the reader for further details.
2.1 Causal models
A signature is a tuple S = 〈U ,V ,R〉, where U is a finite
set of exogenous variables, V is a finite set of endogenous
variables, and R associates with every variable Y ∈ U ∪ V
a finite nonempty set R(Y ) of possible values for Y . Intu-
itively, the exogenous variables are ones whose values are
determined by factors outside the model, while the endoge-
nous variables are ones whose values are ultimately deter-
mined by the exogenous variables. A causal model over sig-
nature S is a tuple M = 〈S,F〉, where F associates with
every endogenous variable X ∈ V a function FX such that
FX : (×U∈UR(U) × (×Y ∈V\{X}R(Y ))) → R(X). That
is, FX describes how the value of the endogenous variable
X is determined by the values of all other variables in U ∪V .
If R(Y ) contains only two values for each Y ∈ U ∪ V , then
we say that M is a binary causal model.
We can describe (some salient features of) a causal model
M using a causal network. A causal network is a graph
with nodes corresponding to the random variables in V and
an edge from a node labeled X to one labeled Y if FY de-
pends on the value of X . Intuitively, variables can have a
causal effect only on their descendants in the causal net-
work; if Y is not a descendant of X , then a change in the
value of X has no affect on the value of Y . For ease of
exposition, we restrict attention to what are called recursive
models. These are ones whose associated causal network
is a directed acyclic graph (that is, a graph that has no cy-
cle of edges). Actually, it suffices for our purposes that, for
each setting ~u for the variables in U , there is no cycle among
the edges of the causal network. We call a setting ~u for the
variables in U a context. It should be clear that if M is a re-
cursive causal model, then there is always a unique solution
to the equations in M , given a context.
The equations determined by {FX : X ∈ V} can be
thought of as representing processes (or mechanisms) by
which values are assigned to variables. For example, if
FX(Y, Z, U) = Y + U (which we usually write as X =
Y + U ), then if Y = 3 and U = 2, then X = 5, regardless
of how Z is set. This equation also gives counterfactual in-
formation. It says that, in the context U = 4, if Y were 4,
then X would be 8, regardless of what value X and Z actu-
ally take in the real world. That is, if U = 4 and the value of
Y were forced to be 4 (regardless of its actual value), then
the value of X would be 8.
While the equations for a given problem are typically ob-
vious, the choice of variables may not be. Consider the
following example (due to Hall (2004)), showing that the
choice of variables influences the causal analysis. Suppose
that Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at
a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering the bottle.
Since both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy’s would have
shattered the bottle had Suzy not thrown.
In this case, a naive model might have an exogenous vari-
able U that encapsulates whatever background factors cause
Suzy and Billy to decide to throw the rock (the details of
U do not matter, since we are interested only in the context
where U ’s value is such that both Suzy and Billy throw), a
variable ST for Suzy throws (ST = 1 if Suzy throws, and
ST = 0 if she doesn’t), a variable BT for Billy throws, and
a variable BS for bottle shatters. In the naive model, whose
graph is given in Figure 1, BS is 1 if one of ST and BT is 1.
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Figure 1: A naive model for the rock-throwing example.
This causal model does not distinguish between Suzy and
Billy’s rocks hitting the bottle simultaneously and Suzy’s
rock hitting first. A more sophisticated model might also
include variables SH and BH, for Suzy’s rock hits the bot-
tle and Billy’s rock hits the bottle. Clearly BS is 1 iff one
of SH and BH is 1. However, now, SH is 1 if ST is 1, and
BH = 1 if BT = 1 and SH = 0. Thus, Billy’s throw hits if
Billy throws and Suzy’s rock doesn’t hit. This model is de-
scribed by the following graph, where we implicitly assume
a context where Suzy throws first, so there is an edge from
SH to BH, but not one in the other direction (and omit the
exogenous variable).
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Figure 2: A better model for the rock-throwing example.
Given a causal model M = (S,F), a (possibly empty)
vector ~X of variables in V , and a vector ~x of values for
the variables in ~X , we define a new causal model, denoted
M ~X←~x, which is identical to M , except that the equation
for the variables ~X in F is replaced by ~X = ~x. Intuitively,
this is the causal model that results when the variables in
~X are set to ~x by some external action that affects only the
variables in ~X (and overrides the effects of the causal equa-
tions). For example, if M is the more sophisticated model
for the rock-throwing example, then MST←0 is the model
where Suzy doesn’t throw.
Given a signature S = (U ,V ,R), a formula of the form
X = x, for X ∈ V and x ∈ R(X), is called a prim-
itive event. A basic causal formula has the form [Y1 ←
y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ, where
• ϕ is a Boolean combination of primitive events;
• Y1, . . . , Yk are distinct variables in V ; and
• yi ∈ R(Yi).
Such a formula is abbreviated as [~Y ← ~y]ϕ. The special
case where k = 0 is abbreviated as ϕ. Intuitively, [Y1 ←
y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]ϕ says that ϕ holds in the counterfactual
world that would arise if Yi is set to yi, for i = 1, . . . , k.
A causal formula is a Boolean combination of basic causal
formulas.
A causal formulaϕ is true or false in a causal model, given
a context. We write (M,~u) |= ϕ if ϕ is true in causal model
M given context ~u. (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y](X = x) if the
variable X has value x in the unique (since we are dealing
with recursive models) solution to the equations inM~Y←~y in
context ~u (i.e., the unique vector of values for the exogenous
variables that simultaneously satisfies all equations F ~Y←~yZ ,
Z ∈ V − ~Y , with the variables in U set to ~u). We extend the
definition to arbitrary causal formulas in the obvious way.
2.2 Causality
We now review the updated HP definition of causality.
Definition 2.1 ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u) if the fol-
lowing three conditions hold:
AC1. (M,~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) ∧ ϕ.
AC2. There exist a partition (~Z, ~W ) of V with ~X ⊆ ~Z and
some setting (~x′, ~w) of the variables in ( ~X, ~W ) such that
if (M,~u) |= Z = z∗ for Z ∈ ~Z, then
(a) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w]¬ϕ.
(b) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all sub-
sets ~Z ′ of ~Z \ ~X and all subsets ~W ′ of ~W , where we
abuse notation and write ~W ′ ← ~w to denote the as-
signment where the variables in ~W ′ get the same values
as they would in the assignment ~W ← ~w, and similarly
for ~Z ′ ← ~z∗. That is, setting any subset ~W ′ of ~W to
the values in ~w should have no effect on ϕ as long as
~X has the value ~x, even if all the variables in an arbi-
trary subset of ~Z are set to their original values in the
context ~u. The tuple ( ~W, ~w, ~x′) is said to be a witness
to the fact that ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ.
AC3. ( ~X = ~x) is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies AC2.
If ~X is a singleton, then X = x is said to be a singleton
cause of ϕ in (M,~u).
AC1 just says that A cannot be a cause of B unless both
A andB are true. The core of this definition lies in AC2. In-
formally, the variables in ~Z should be thought of as describ-
ing the “active causal process” from X to ϕ. These are the
variables that mediate betweenX and ϕ. AC2(a) is reminis-
cent of the traditional counterfactual criterion, according to
which X = x is a cause of ϕ if changing the value of X re-
sults in ϕ being false. However, AC2(a) is more permissive
than the traditional criterion; it allows the dependence of ϕ
on X to be tested under special structural contingencies, in
which the variables ~W are held constant at some setting ~w.
AC2(b) is an attempt to counteract the “permissiveness” of
AC2(a) with regard to structural contingencies. Essentially,
it ensures that X alone suffices to bring about the change
from ϕ to ¬ϕ; setting ~W to ~w merely eliminates spurious
side effects that tend to mask the action of X .
To understand the role of AC2(b), consider the rock-
throwing example again. Let M be the model in Figure 1,
and let ~u be the context where both Suzy and Billy throw.
It is easy to see that both Suzy and Billy are causes of the
bottle shattering in (M,~u): Let ~Z = {ST, BS}, and con-
sider the structural contingency where Billy doesn’t throw
(BT = 0). Clearly (M,U) |= [ST ← 0,BT ← 0](BS = 0)
and (M,u) |= [ST ← 1,BT ← 0](BS = 1), so Suzy is a
cause of the bottle shattering. A symmetric argument shows
that Billy is also a cause.
But now consider the model M ′ described in Figure 2;
again, u is the context where both Suzy and Billy throw. It
is still the case that Suzy is a cause of the bottle shattering
in (M ′, u). We can take ~W = {BT} and again consider the
contingency where Billy doesn’t throw. However, Billy is
not a cause of the bottle shattering in (M ′, u). For suppose
that we now take ~W = {ST} and consider the contingency
where Suzy doesn’t throw. Clearly AC2(a) holds, since if
Billy doesn’t throw (under this contingency), then the bot-
tle doesn’t shatter. However, AC2(b) does not hold. Since
BH ∈ ~Z, if we set BH to 0 (its original value), then AC2(b)
would require that (M ′, u) |= [BT ← 1, ST ← 0,BH ←
0](BS = 1), but this is not the case. Similar arguments
show that no other choice of (~Z, ~W ) makes Billy’s throw a
cause of the bottle shattering in (M ′, u).
The original HP definition differs from the updated def-
inition in only one respect. Rather than requiring that
(M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all subsets
~W ′ of ~W , it was required to hold only for ~W . That is, the
following condition was used instead of AC2(b).
AC2(b′) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ for all
subsets ~Z ′ of ~Z .
The requirement for AC2(b) to hold for all subsets of W
in the updated definition prevents situations where W “con-
ceals other causes forϕ”. The role of this requirement is per-
haps best understood by considering the following example,
due to Hopkins and Pearl (2003) (the description is taken
from (Halpern & Pearl 2005)): Suppose that a prisoner dies
either if A loads B’s gun and B shoots, or if C loads and
shoots his gun. Taking D to represent the prisoner’s death
and making the obvious assumptions about the meaning of
the variables, we have that D = (A ∧B) ∨C. Suppose that
in the actual context u, A loads B’s gun, B does not shoot,
but C does load and shoot his gun, so that the prisoner dies.
That is, A = 1,B = 0, andC = 1. ClearlyC = 1 is a cause
ofD = 1. We would not want to say thatA = 1 is a cause of
D = 1, given that B did not shoot (i.e., given that B = 0).
However, with AC2(b′), A = 1 is a cause of D = 1. For we
can take ~W = {B,C} and consider the contingency where
B = 1 and C = 0. It is easy to check that AC2(a) and
AC2(b′) hold for this contingency, so under the original HP
definition, A = 1 is a cause of D = 1. However, AC2(b)
fails in this case, since (M,u) |= [A← 1, C ← 0](D = 0).
The key point is that AC2(b) says that for A = 1 to be a
cause of D = 1, it must be the case that D = 0 if only some
of the values in ~W are set to ~w. That means that the other
variables get the same value as they do in the actual con-
text; in this case, by setting only A to 1 and leavingB unset,
B takes on its original value of 0, in which case D = 0.
AC2(b′) does not consider this case.
Using AC2(b) rather than AC2(b′) has been shown to have
a significant benefit (and to lead to more intuitive results)
when causality is applied to program verification, with the
goal of understanding what in the code is the cause of a pro-
gram not satisfying its specification (Beer et al. 2012).
3 Relevant Complexity Classes
In this section, we briefly recall the definitions of the com-
plexity classes that we need for our results, and define the
complexity class Dk2 .
Recall that the polynomial hierarchy is a hierarchy of
complexity classes that generalize the classes NP and co-
NP. Let ΣP1 = NP and ΠP1 = co-NP. For i > 1, define
ΣPi = NPΣ
P
i−1 and ΠPi = (co-NP)Σ
P
i−1 , where, in gen-
eral, XY denotes the class of problems solvable by a Tur-
ing machine in class A augmented with an oracle for a prob-
lem complete for classB. (See (Meyer & Stockmeyer 1972;
Stockmeyer 1977) for more details and intuition.)
We now define the classes DPk as follows.
Definition 3.1 For k = 1, 2, . . .,
DPk = {L : ∃L1, L2 : L1 ∈ Σ
P
k , L2 ∈ Π
P
k , L = L1 ∩ L2}.
For k = 1, the class DP1 is the well-known complexity
class DP , defined by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (1984).
It contains exact problems such as the language of pairs
〈G, k〉, where G is a graph that has a maximal clique of size
exactly k. As usual, we say that a language L is DPk com-
plete if it is in DPk and is the “hardest” language in DPk , in
the sense that there is a polynomial time reduction from any
language L′ ∈ DPk to L.
Recall that a quantified Boolean formula (QBF) is a gen-
eralization of a propositional formula, where some proposi-
tional variables are quantified. Thus, for example, ∃x∀y(x∨
y) is a QBF. A closed QBF (CQBF) is one where there are
no free propositional variables. A CQBF is either true or
false, independent of the truth assignment. The “canonical”
languages complete for Σk2 and Πk2 consist of the CQBFs
with k alternations of quantifiers starting with ∃ (resp., ∀)
that are true. In particular, let
ΣP2 (SAT) =
{∃ ~X∀~Y ϕ | ∃ ~X∀~Y ϕ is a CQBF, ∃ ~X∀~Y ϕ = true}
ΠP2 (SAT) =
{∀ ~X∃~Y ϕ | ∀ ~X∃~Y ϕ is a CQBF, ∀ ~X∃~Y ϕ = true}.
ΣP2 (SAT) is complete for ΣP2 and ΠP2 (SAT) is complete for
ΠP2 (Wrathall 1976).
The following lemma provides a useful condition suffi-
cient for a language to be DPk -complete.
Lemma 3.2 If L1 is ΣPk -complete and L2 is ΠPk -complete,
then L3 = L1 ∩ L2 is DPk -complete.
Proof: The fact that L3 is in DPk is immediate from the
definition of DPk . For hardness, let L′3 be a language in DPk .
Then there exist L′1 and L′2 such that L′1 ∈ ΣPk , L′2 ∈ ΠPk ,
and L′ = L′1 ∩ L′2. Let f be a polynomial-time reduction
from L′1 to L1, and let g be a polynomial-time reduction
from L′2 to L2 (the existence of such reductions f and g
follows from the fact that L1 and L2 are ΣPk -complete and
ΠPk -complete, respectively). Then, 〈f, g〉 is a polynomial-
time reduction from L′3 to L3, as required.
Essentially the same argument shows that if L1 is ΣPk -hard
and L2 is ΠPk -hard, then L3 = L1 ∩ L2 is DPk -hard.
Determining whether ~X = ~x is a cause of ϕ in (M,u) is
a decision problem: we define a language and try to deter-
mine whether a particular tuple is in that language. (See
Section 4 for the formal definition.) Determining degree
of responsibility and blame is a different type of problem,
since we are determining which number represents the de-
gree of responsibility (resp., blame). Formally, these are
function problems. For ease of exposition, we restrict at-
tention to functions from some strings over some fixed lan-
guage Σ to strings over Σ (i.e., we are considering functions
from Σ∗ to Σ∗). For a complexity class A in the polyno-
mial hierarchy, FPA[logn] consists of all functions that can
be computed by a polynomial-time Turing machine with
an A-oracle which on input x asks a total of O(log |x|)
queries (Papadimitriou 1984). A function f(x) is FPA[logn]-
hard iff for every function g(x) in FPA[logn] there exist
polynomially computable functions R,S : Σ∗ → Σ∗ such
that g(x) = S(f(R(x))). A function f(x) is complete in
FPA[logn] iff it is in FPA[logn] and is FPA[logn]-hard.
Finally, for a complexity class A in polynomial hierar-
chy, FPA|| is the class of functions that can be computed
by a polynomial-time Turing machine with parallel (i.e.,
non-adaptive) queries to an A-oracle. (For background
on these complexity classes, see (Jenner & Toran 1995;
Johnson 1990).)
4 Complexity for the Updated HP Definition
In this section, we prove our results on the complexity of de-
ciding causality. We start by defining the problem formally.
In the definitions, M stands for a causal model, ~u is a con-
text, ~X is a subset of variables of M , and ~x is the set of
values of ~X in (M,~u):
Lcause = {〈M,~u, ϕ, ~X, ~x〉 : ( ~X = ~x)
is a cause of ϕ in (M,~u)}.
One of our goals is to understand the cause of the complex-
ity of computing causality. Towards this end, it is useful to
define two related languages:
LAC2 = {〈M,~u, ϕ, ~X, ~x〉 : ( ~X = ~x) satisfies conditions
AC1 and AC2 of Def. 2.1 for ϕ in (M,~u)},
LAC3 = {〈M,~u, ϕ, ~X, ~x〉 : ( ~X = ~x) satisfies conditions
AC1 and AC3 of Def. 2.1 for ϕ in (M,~u)}.
It is easy to see that Lcause = LAC2 ∩ LAC3.
Let L1cause be the subset of Lcause where ~X and ~x are
singletons; this is the singleton causality problem. We can
similarly define L1AC2 and L
1
AC3. Again, we have L
1
cause =
L1AC2 ∩ L
1
AC3, but, in fact, we have L
1
cause = L
1
AC2, since
L1AC2 ⊆ L
1
AC3; for singleton causality, the minimality con-
dition AC3 trivially holds.
We denote by LBcause the language of causality for binary
causal models (i.e., where the models M in the tuple are bi-
nary models), and by LBAC2 and LBAC3 the languages LAC2
andLAC3 restricted to binary causal models. Again we have
that LBcause = LBAC2 ∩ L
B
AC3. And again, we can define
LB,1cause, L
B,1
AC2, and L
B,1
AC3, and we have L
B,1
cause = L
B,1
AC2.
We start by considering singleton causality. As we ob-
served, Eiter and Lukasiewicz (2002) and Hopkins (2001)
showed that, with the original HP definition, singleton
causality and causality coincide. However, for the updated
definition, Halpern (2008) showed that it is in fact possi-
ble to have minimal causes that are not singletons. Thus,
we consider singleton causality and general causality sepa-
rately. We can clarify where the complexity lies by consid-
ering LAC2 (and its sublanguages) and LAC3 (and its sub-
languages) separately.
Theorem 4.1 The languages LAC2, L1AC2, L
B,1
AC2, and
L1AC2 are Σ
P
2 -complete.
Proof outline: To show all these languages are in ΣP ,
given a tuple 〈M,~u, ϕ, ~X, ~x〉, checking that AC1 holds, that
is, checking that (M,~u) |= ~X = ~x ∧ ϕ, can be done in time
polynomial in the size of M , | ~X|, and |ϕ| (the length of ϕ as
a string of symbols). For AC2, we need only guess the set
~W and the assignment ~w. The check that assigning ~w to ~W
and x′ to X indeed falsifies ϕ is polynomial, and we use an
NP oracle to check that for all subsets of ~W and all subsets
of ~Z , condition AC2(b) holds. (The argument is quite sim-
ilar to Eiter and Lukasiewicz’s argument that causality is in
ΣP2 for general models with the original HP definition.)
For hardness, it clearly suffices to show that LB,1AC2 is Σ
P
2 -
hard. We do this by reducing ΣP2 (SAT) to L
B,1
AC2. Given
a CQBF formula ∃ ~X∀~Y ϕ, we show that we can efficiently
construct a causal formula ψ, model M , and context u such
that ∃ ~X∀~Y ϕ = true iff (M,u, ψ,A, 0) ∈ LB,1AC2. We leave
details to the appendix.
Since, as we have observed, AC3 is vacuous in the case
of singleton causality, it follows that singleton causality is
ΣP2 -complete.
Corollary 4.2 L1cause and L
B,1
cause are Σ2-complete.
We now show that things are harder if we do not restrict to
binary causal models (unless the polynomial hierarchy col-
lapses). As a first step, we consider the complexity of LAC3
and LBAC3.
Theorem 4.3 LAC3 and LBAC3 are Π
P
2 -complete.
Proof outline: The fact that LAC3 and LBAC3 are in Π
P
2 is
straightforward. Again, given a tuple 〈M,~u, ϕ, ~X, ~x〉, we
can check that AC1 holds in polynomial time. For AC3, we
need to check that for all strict subsets ~X ′ of ~X , AC2 fails.
Since checking AC2 is in ΣP2 , checking that it fails is in ΠP2 .
Checking that it fails for all strict subsets ~X ′ keeps it in ΠP2
(since it just adds one more universal quantifier).
To prove that these languages are ΠP2 -hard, we show that
we can reduce ΠP2 (SAT) to LBAC3. The proof is similar in
spirit to the proof of Theorem 4.1; we leave details to the
appendix.
We are now ready to prove our main result.
Theorem 4.4 Lcause and LBcause are DP2 -complete.
Proof: Membership of Lcause (and hence also LBcause) in
DP2 follows from the fact that Lcause = LAC2 ∩ LAC3,
LAC2 ∈ Σ
P
2 , and LAC3 ∈ ΠP2 . The fact that LBcause (and
hence also Lcause) are DP2 -hard follows from Lemma 3.2
and Theorems 4.1 and 4.3.
The fact that there may be more than one conjunct in a
cause using the updated HP definition means that checking
AC3 becomes nontrivial, and causes the increase in com-
plexity for ΣP2 to DP2 . But why is there no dropoff with the
updated HP definition when we restrict to binary models,
although there is a dropoff from ΣP2 to NP for the original
HP definition? To prove their NP-completeness result, Eiter
and Lukasiewicz (2002) showed that for binary models, with
the original HP definition, the set ~Z and its subsets can be
omitted from the definition of cause. That is, we can replace
AC2(b′) by
AC2(b′′) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ← ~w]ϕ
to get an equivalent definition. The example that a cause
may require more than one conjunct given by Halpern
(2008) shows that removing ~Z and its subsets from AC2(b)
does not result in an equivalent definition in binary models.
But even if it did, the fact that we need to quantify over all
subset ~W ′ of ~W in AC2(b) would be enough to ensure that
there is no dropoff in complexity in binary models.
5 Responsibility and Blame
In this section, we review the definitions of responsibility
and blame and characterize their complexity. See Chockler
and Halpern (2004) for more intuition and details.
5.1 Responsibility
The definition of responsibility given by Chockler and
Halpern (2004) was given based on the original HP defini-
tion of causality, and thus assumed that causes were always
single conjuncts. It is straightforward to extend it to allow
causes to have arbitrarily many conjuncts.
Definition 5.1 The degree of responsibility of ~X = ~x for ϕ
in (M,~u), denoted dr((M,~u), ( ~X = ~x), ϕ), is 0 if ~X = ~x
is not a cause of ϕ in (M,~u); it is 1/(k + 1) if ~X = ~x is a
cause of ϕ in (M,~u) and there exists a partition (~Z, ~W ) and
setting (~x′, ~w) for which AC2 holds such that (a) k variables
in ~W have different values in ~w than they do in the context
~u and (b) there is no partition (~Z ′, ~W ′) and setting (~x′′, ~w′)
satisfying AC2 such that only k′ < k variables have different
values in ~w′ than they do the context ~u.
Intuitively, dr((M,~u), ( ~X = ~x), ϕ) measures the mini-
mal number of changes that have to be made in ~u in order
to make ϕ counterfactually depend on ~X , provided the con-
ditions on the subsets of ~W and ~Z are satisfied (see also the
voting example from the introduction). If there is no par-
tition of V to (~Z, ~W ) that satisfies AC2, or ( ~X = ~x) does
not satisfy AC3 for ϕ in (M,~u), then the minimal number
of changes in ~u in Definition 5.1 is taken to have cardinality
∞, and thus the degree of responsibility of ( ~X = ~x) is 0
(and hence it is not a cause).
In the original HP model, it was shown that com-
puting responsibility is FPNP[logn]-complete in binary
causal models (Chockler, Halpern, & Kupferman 2008)
and FPΣ
P
2
[logn]
-complete in general causal models
(Chockler & Halpern 2004). We now characterize the
complexity of computing responsibility in the updated HP
definition.
Theorem 5.2 Computing the degree of responsibility is
FPΣ
P
2
[logn]
-complete for singleton causes in binary and
general causal models.
Proof outline: The proof is quite similar to the proof in
(Chockler & Halpern 2004). We prove membership by de-
scribing an algorithm in FPΣ
P
2
[logn]for computing the degree
of responsibility. Roughly speaking, the algorithm queries
an oracle for the language R = {(〈(M,~u), (X = x), ϕ, i〉
such that 〈(M,~u), (X = x), ϕ〉 ∈ Lcause and the degree
of responsibility of (X = x) for ϕ is at least i}. It is easy
to see that R is in ΣP2 by using Corollary 4.2. The algo-
rithm for computing the degree of responsibility performs a
binary search on the value of dr((M,~u), (X = x), ϕ), each
time dividing the range of possible values for the degree of
responsibility by 2 according to the answer of R. The num-
ber of possible candidates for the degree of responsibility is
bounded by the size of the input n, and thus the number of
queries is at most ⌈logn⌉.
For hardness in binary causal models (which im-
plies hardness in general causal models), we provide
a reduction from the ΣP2 -complete problem MINQSAT2
(Chockler & Halpern 2004) to the degree of responsibility,
where MINQSAT2(∃ ~X∀~Y ψ) is the minimum number of 1’s
in the satisfying assignment to ~X for ∃ ~X∀~Y ψ if such an as-
signment exists, and | ~X|+ 1 otherwise.
Theorem 5.3 Computing the degree of responsibility is
FPD2[logn]-complete in binary and general causal models.
Proof outline: Membership in FPD2[logn]is shown in quite
a similar way to Theorem 5.2. For hardness, as there are no
known natural problems complete in FPD2[logn], the proof
proceeds by constructing a generic reduction from a problem
in FPD2[logn] to the degree of responsibility.
5.2 Blame
The definition of blame addresses the situation where there
is uncertainty about the true situation or “how the world
works”. Blame, introduced in (Chockler & Halpern 2004),
considers the “true situation” to be determined by the con-
text, and “how the world works” to be determined by the
structural equations. An agent’s uncertainty is modeled by a
pair (K,Pr), where K is a set of pairs of the form (M,~u),
where M is a causal model and ~u is a context, and Pr is a
probability distribution overK. A pair (M,~u) is called a sit-
uation. We think of K as describing the situations that the
agent considers possible before ~X is set to ~x. The degree
of blame that setting ~X to ~x has for ϕ is then the expected
degree of responsibility of ~X = ~x for ϕ in (M ~X←~x, ~u),
taken over the situations (M,~u) ∈ K. Note that the situ-
ation (M ~X←~x, ~u) for (M,~u) ∈ K are those that the agent
considers possible after ~X is set to ~x.
Definition 5.4 The degree of blame of setting ~X to ~x for ϕ
relative to epistemic state (K,Pr), denoted db(K,Pr, ~X ←
~x, ϕ), is
∑
(M,~u)∈K
dr((M ~X←~x, ~u), ~X = ~x, ϕ) Pr((M,~u)).
For the original HP definition of cause, Chockler and
Halpern (2004) show that computing the degree of blame is
complete in FPΣ
P
2
|| for general and in FP
NP
|| for binary causal
models. Again, with the updated HP definition, the com-
plexity changes.
Theorem 5.5 The problem of computing blame in recursive
causal models is FPΣ
P
2
|| -complete for singleton causes and
FPD2|| -complete for (general) causes, in binary and general
causal models.
A Proof of Theorem 4.1
As we oberved in the main part of the paper, membership
is straightforward, so we focus here on hardness. For hard-
ness, we describe a reduction from the language Σ2(SAT)
to LB,1AC2. In the process, we work with both propositional
formulas with propositional variables, and causal formulas,
that use formulas likeX = 1 andX = 0. We can think ofX
as a propositional variable here, where X = 1 denotes that
X is true, and X = 0 denotes that x is false. If ϕ is a propo-
sitional formula, let ϕ be the causal formula that results by
replacing each occurrence of a propositional variable X by
X = 1.
Given a CQBF ∃ ~X∀~Y ϕ, consider the tuple
(M,u, ψ,A, 0) where M = (U ,V ,R) is a binary
causal model and
• U = {U};
• V = {X0 | X ∈ ~X} ∪ {X1 | X ∈ ~X} ∪ {Y | Y ∈
~Y }∪{A}, whereA is a fresh variable that does not appear
in ~X or ~Y ;
• for all variables V ∈ ~V , the structural equation is V = U
(i.e. all the variables in V are set to the value of U );
• u = 0;
• ψ = ψ1 ∨ (ψ2 ∧ ψ3) where ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 are the following
causal formulas:
– ψ1 = ¬
(∧
X∈ ~X(X
0 6= X1)
)
;1
– ψ2 = ¬(A = 1 ∧ ~Y = ~1);
– ψ3 = A = 1∨ϕ[ ~X/ ~X1], where ϕ[ ~X/ ~X1] is the result
of replacing each occurrence of a variable X ∈ ~X by
X1).
We prove that ∃ ~X∀~Y ϕ = true iff A = 0 is a cause of ψ in
(M,u) (which is the case iff (M,u, ψ,A, 0) ∈ LB,1AC2, since
AC3 is vacuous for binary models).
First suppose that ∃ ~X∀~Y ϕ = true. To show that A = 0
is a cause of ψ in (M,u), we prove that AC1 and AC2 hold.
Clearly AC1 holds: (M,u) |= A = 0 by the definition
of FA, and (M,u) |= ψ since (M,u) |= ψ1, again by the
definition of F .
For AC2, let ~W = V −{A}. and define ~w as follows. Let
τ be an assignment to the variables in ~X for which ∀~Y ϕ =
true. Using ~w(X) to denote the value of X according to ~w,
we require that
• ~w(Xτ(X)) = 1;
• ~w(X1−τ(X)) = 0; and
• ~w(Y ) = 1.
For AC2(a), note that (M,u) |= [A ← 1, ~W ← ~w]¬ψ1
(since ~w assigns different values to X0 and X1 for all
X ∈ ~X) and, since ~w(Y ) = 1 for all Y ∈ ~Y , we have
that (M,u) |= [A ← 1, ~W ← ~w]¬ψ2, so (M,u) |=
[ ~A← 1,W ← ~w]¬ψ. Thus, AC2(a) holds.
It now remains to show that AC2(b) holds. Fix ~W ′ ⊆ ~W .
We must show that (M,u) |= [A ← 0, ~W ′ ← ~w]ψ. (The
condition “for all ~Z ′ ⊆ ~Z − {A}” is vacuous in this case,
since ~Z = {A}.) Since the definition of M guarantees that
(M,u) |= [A ← 0, ~W ′ ← ~w]ψ iff (M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w]ψ,
we focus on the latter from here on in.
If (M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w]ψ1 , we are done. So suppose that
(M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w]¬ψ1; that is,
(M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w]

 ∧
X∈ ~X
(X0 6= X1)

 . (1)
It follows that, for each variable X ∈ ~X , we have that
(M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w](X1 = τ(X)). To see this, note that
if τ(X) = 1, then we must have X1 ∈ ~W ′; otherwise, we
would have (M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w](X1 = 0 ∧ X0 = 0),
contradicting (1). And if τ(X) = 0, then since ~w(X1) = 0,
we must have (M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w](X1 = 0), whether or
not X1 ∈ ~W ′, so (M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w]ψ3. It follows that
(M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w]ψ, showing that AC2(b) holds.
Finally, we must show that if A = 0 is a cause of ψ in
(M,u) then ∃ ~X∀~Y ϕ = true.
1As usual, we take X0 6= X1 to be an abbreviation for the
causal formula (X0 = 1 ∧X1 = 0) ∨ (X0 = 0 ∧X1 = 1).
So suppose that A = 0 is a cause of ψ in (M,u). Then
there exists a witness ( ~W, ~w, a). Since we are considering
binary models, we must have a = 1, so we have
(M,u) |= [A← 1, ~W ← ~w]¬ψ. (2)
This implies that (M,u)[A← 1, ~W ← ~w] |= ¬ψ1, so
(M,u) |= [A← 1, ~W ← ~w]

 ∧
X∈ ~X
(X0 6= X1)

 .
Define τ so that τ(X) = b, where b ∈ {0, 1} is the unique
value for which (M,u)[A← 1, ~W ← ~w] |= Xb = 1.
It also follows from (2) that
(M,u) |= [A← 1, ~W ← ~w]¬(ψ2 ∧ ψ3).
Since clearly (M,u) |= [A← 1, ~W ← ~w]ψ2, we must have
(M,u) |= [A← 1, ~W ← ~w]¬ψ3. Indeed, we must have
(M,u) |= [A← 1, ~W ← ~w](~Y = ~1).
It follows that Y ∈ ~W and ~w(Y ) = 1 for all y ∈ ~Y .
Now let ν be an assignment to ~X and ~Y such that ν| ~X =
τ . It cleary suffices to show that ϕ is true under assignment
τ . Let ~W ′ = ~W−{Y ∈ ~Y | ν(Y ) = 0}; that is, ~W ′ contains
all the variables Xb that are in ~W , and all the variables Y ∈
~Y for which ν(Y ) = 1. By AC2(b), it follows that (M,u) |=
[ ~W ′ ← ~w]ψ. Since ~W ′ contains all the variables Xb in ~W ,
we have that (M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w]¬ψ1. Thus, we must
have that (M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w]ψ3. Since (M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ←
~w](A = 0), it follows that (M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w]ϕ[ ~X/ ~X1].
Note that, for Y ∈ ~Y ~w(Y ) = 1 iff ν(Y ) = 1; moreover,
~w(X1) = 1 iff τ(X) = 1 iff ν(X) = 1. Thus, the fact that
(M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w]ψ3 implies that ϕ is satisfied by ν, so
we are done.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
B Proof of Theorem 4.3
Again, as we oberved in the main part of the paper, mem-
bership is straightforward, so we focus on hardness. We
describe a reduction from the language Π2(SAT) to LBAC3,
which suffices to prove the result. The argument is similar
in spirit to that for Theorem 4.1.
Given a CQBF ∀~Y ∃ ~Xϕ, consider the tuple
(M,u, ψ, 〈A1, A2〉, 〈0, 0〉) where M = (U ,V ,R) is a
binary causal model and
• U = {U};
• V = ~X ∪ {Y 0 | Y ∈ ~Y } ∪ {Y 1 | Y ∈ ~Y } ∪ {A1, A2, S},
where A1, A2, and S are fresh variables;
• the structural equations for A1 and A2 are A1 = S and
A2 = S, and, for all other variables V ∈ V , the equation
is V = U ;
• u = 0;
• ψ = ψ1 ∨ (ψ2 ∧ ψ3) ∨ (S = 0) where
– ψ1 = ¬
(∧
Y ∈~Y (Y
0 6= Y 1)
)
;
– ψ2 = ¬( ~A = 1 ∧ ~X = 1);
– ψ3 = (A1 = A2) ∨ ¬ϕ[~Y /~Y 1].
We prove that ∀~Y ∃ ~Xϕ = true iff (M,u, ψ, ~A,~0) is in
LBAC3.
First suppose that ∀~Y ∃ ~Xϕ = true. To show that
(M,u, ψ, ~A,~0) is in LBAC3, we must prove that AC1 and
AC3 hold.
For AC1, since (M,u) |= ~Y 0 = ~Y 1 = ~0, we clearly have
(M,u) |= ψ1, so (M,u) |= ( ~A = ~0) ∧ ψ.
To show that AC3 holds, we need to show that neither
A1 = 0 nor A2 = 0 is a cause of ψ in (M,u). We prove
that A1 = 0 is not a cause of ψ in (M,u); the argument for
A2 = 0 not being a cause is identical.
It suffices to prove that AC2 does not hold. So suppose
by way of contradiction that ( ~W, ~w, 1) is a witness for A1
being a cause of ψ in (M,u). Since AC2(a) holds, we must
have
(M,u) |= [A1 ← 1, ~W ← ~w](¬ψ1∧(¬ψ2∨¬ψ3)∧(S = 1)).
(3)
Thus, S ∈ ~W and ~w(S) = 1 (for otherwise (M,u) |=
[A1 ← 1, ~W ← ~w](S = 0)). Moreover, since (M,u) |=
[A1 ← 1, ~W ← ~w]¬ψ1, for all Y ∈ ~Y , either Y 0 ∈ ~W and
~w(Y 0) = 1 or Y 1 ∈ ~W and ~w(Y 1) = 1, and it is not the
case that both Y 0 and Y 1 are in ~W and ~w(Y 0) = ~w(Y 1).
Now consider A2. There are three possibilities:
(a) A2 ∈ ~W and ~w(A2) = 0;
(b) A2 ∈ ~W and ~w(A2) = 1;
(c) A2 /∈ ~W .
We show that we get a contradiction in each case.
If (a) holds, note that since
(M,u) |= [A1 ← 1, ~W ← ~w](A2 = 0),
it follows that (M,u) |= [A1 ← 1, ~W ← ~w]ψ2, so by
(3), (M,u) |= [A1 ← 1, ~W ← ~w]¬ψ3. Moreover, since
(M,u) |= [A1 ← 1, ~W ← ~w](A1 6= A2) ∧ ¬ψ3, it follows
that (M,u) |= [A1 ← 1, ~W ← ~w]ϕ[~Y /~Y 1].
Let Z ′ = ∅ and let ~W ′ = ~W − {A2}. We show that
(M,u) |= [A1 ← 0, ~W
′ ← ~w]¬ψ, so that AC2(b) does not
hold. First observe that (M,u) |= [ ~W ′ ← ~w](A1 6= A2).
Since S and all the variables in ~X , ~Y 0, and ~Y 1 are in both
~W ′ and ~W , it follows from (3) that
(M,u) |= [A1 ← 0, ~W
′ ← ~w](¬ψ1∧ϕ[~Y /~Y
1]∧ (S = 1)).
Thus, (M,u) |= [A1 ← 0, ~W ′ ← ~w]¬ψ, and AC2(b) does
not hold.
If (b) or (c) hold, define an assignment ν to the variables
in ~Y by taking ν(Y ) = 1 if Y 1 ∈ ~W and ~w(Y 1) = 1 and
ν(Y ) = 0 if Y 0 ∈ ~W and ~w(Y 0) = 1. (As we observed
above, exactly one of these two cases occurs, so ν is well
defined.) By assumption, ∀~Y ∃ ~Xϕ = true, so there exists
an assignment τ to ~X that makes ϕ true if the assignment to
~Y is determined by ν.
We again show that AC2(b) does not hold. Let Z ′ = ∅
and let ~W ′ = ~W − {X : τ(X) = 0}. Since S ∈ ~W ′ and
~w(S) = 1, it is easy to see that in both case (b) and (c),
we have (M,u) |= [A1 ← 0, ~W ′ ← ~w](A1 6= A2). (In
case (b), this is becaause ~w(A2) = 1; in case (c), this is
because we have the equation A2 = S and ~w(S) = 1). The
definition of ~W ′ ensures that
(M,u) |= [A1 ← 0, ~W
′ ← ~w]ϕ[~Y /~Y 1],
so that (M,u) |= [A1 ← 0, ~W ′ ← ~w]¬ψ3, and hence also
(M,u) |= [A1 ← 0, ~W ′ ← ~w]¬ψ, again showing that
AC2(b) does not hold. We conclude that AC3 holds for ~A.
Now suppose that (M,u, ψ, ~A,~0) is in LBAC3. We must
show that ∀~Y ∃ ~Xϕ( ~X, ~Y ) = true.
Let ν be some assignment to ~Y . Let ~W = {S} ∪ ~X ∪
~Y 0 ∪ ~Y 1 and define ~w as follows:
• ~w(S) = 1;
• ~w(X) = 1 for all X ∈ ~X;
• ~w(Y ν(y)) = 1 and ~w(Y 1−ν(y)) = 0 for all Y ∈ ~Y .
Since AC3 holds, A1 ← 0 cannot be a cause of ψ in
(M,u) with witness ( ~W , ~w, 1). It is straightforward to
check that (M,u) |= [A1 ← 1, ~W ← ~w]¬ψ, using the
fact that ~w(S) = 1. Hence, AC2(a) holds for A1 ← 0. AC3
holds trivially, and we have already observed that A1 holds.
Thus, AC2(b) cannot hold for A2 ← 0, that is, there ex-
ist ~W ′ ⊆ ~W and ~Z ′ ⊆ {A2} such that (M,u) |= [A1 ←
0, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]¬ψ. It follows that
• S ∈ ~W ′ and ~w(S) = 1; and
• either Y 0 ∈ ~W ′ and ~w(Y 0) = 1 or Y 1 ∈ ~W ′ and
~w(Y 1) = 1, and it is not the case that both Y 0 and Y 1
are in ~W ′ and ~w(Y 0) = ~w(Y 1).
Since (M,u) |= [A1 ← 0, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ψ2,
it must be the case that (M,u) |= [A1 ← 0, ~W ′ ←
~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]¬ψ3. This, in turn, implies that (M,u) |=
[A1 ← 0, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ[~Y /~Y 1]. Now (M,u) |=
[ ~A′ ← ~a′, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ψ2. Thus, we must have
(M,u) |= [ ~A′ ← ~a′, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]¬ψ3; thus,
(M,u) |= [ ~A′ ← ~a′, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]ϕ[~Y /~Y 1]. Now
define τ(X) = 1 iff X ∈ ~W ′. It is immediate that τ sat-
isfies ϕ if the values of Y are assigned according to ν. It
follows that ∀~Y ∃ ~Xϕ( ~X, ~Y ) = true, as desired.
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